The precise date and cause of the fire remain unknown. Kosovo Police have confirmed that the property was unoccupied and that investigators, regional forensic officers and a fire expert attended the scene. Following consultation with the State Prosecutor, the case was opened for investigation as suspected arson.

expects the competent authorities to establish when the fire occurred, how it started and, if deliberately set, who was responsible.

But the chronology surrounding this incident cannot be ignored.

The house was discovered burned only ten days after the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague delivered its judgment against Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi. On 16 September, the Trial Panel convicted all four of war crimes including arbitrary detention, cruel treatment, torture and murder. Thaçi and Krasniqi were sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment, Veseli to 18 years and Selimi to 13 years.

Frontline Media Group and its publications, The and , have been extensively engaged in investigating and reporting on these proceedings, the evidential record underlying them, political violence in Kosovo and the networks surrounding the former political leadership.

Gunpowder Chronicles

Thaçi’s Assassination Manual

In April 2025 our newsroom began pulling at a thread that kept resurfacing in different forms and different places. It was a claim that a Russian Serbian Kosovan entangled network had been tasked, by Hashim Thaçi and associates, with undermining the Kosovo court process in The Hague. That work started as a national security story and it stayed one. But as we mapped names, timelines and incentives, we kept returning to an older question that Kosovo never fully answered after the war. How did power consolidate so quickly, and what did it cost…

Read more

8 months ago · 3 likes · Vudi Xhymshiti and Michael Sheppard

Our journalists were also physically present in The Hague for the judgment.

In the period surrounding that judgment, Mr Xhymshiti was subjected to escalating public hostility, including being branded a “spy”1, confronted while reporting in The Hague and subsequently depicted in online material containing explicit references to his death and to where a bullet should strike his forehead2.

The discovery of the burned property must therefore be investigated within its full chronology.

We are not asserting that the judgment, any political organisation or any individual caused this fire. That determination belongs to investigators and ultimately to the courts.

We are saying something simpler: given the documented threats and targeting preceding the discovery of the fire, it would be irresponsible to treat this incident in isolation before the evidence establishes otherwise.

The timing of the fire is now a critical evidential question.

Police must determine when it occurred. Fire investigators must determine its origin and cause. If the evidence establishes deliberate ignition, investigators must establish who carried it out, whether others ordered or facilitated it, and whether there is any connection to the threats and intimidation directed at Mr Xhymshiti because of his journalism.

The Kosovo Specialist Chambers found that perceived opponents of the KLA’s political and military objectives had been labelled, often falsely, as “collaborators” or “spies” before being subjected to detention, mistreatment and, in some cases, murder. The Trial Panel found that Thaçi significantly contributed to that common criminal purpose.

Against that historical and judicially established background, latest language branding a journalist a “spy”, followed by explicit death rhetoric and the subsequent discovery of his family home burned, demands serious investigation, not speculation, dismissal or political interpretation.

Frontline Media Group will preserve all relevant evidence and cooperate fully with competent authorities in Kosovo and the United Kingdom.

Our investigations into the Kosovo Specialist Chambers proceedings, political violence, intelligence networks and threats against journalists will continue.

A fire will not determine what we investigate.
A threat will not determine what we publish.
Evidence will.

FRONTLINE MEDIA GROUP
THE GUNPOWDER CHRONICLES | KRONIKAT E BARUTIT
London, United Kingdom

KRONIKAT E BARUTIT

FRONTLINE MEDIA GROUP: ZJARRI DUHET HETUAR. KRONOLOGJIA NUK MUND TË SHPËRFILLET.

LONDËR, 28 SHTATOR 2026 - Të shtunën, më 26 shtator 2026, një anëtar i familjes së themeluesit dhe kryeredaktorit të The Frontline Media Group, Vudi Xhymshiti, e gjeti të djegur shtëpinë e prindërve të tij të ndjerë në Livoç të Ulët, Gjil…

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18 days ago

A Facebook account using the name Bekim Jashari wrote publicly: “Edhe në birë të miut nese hyn ka me hongër plumbin ky dhe tradhtarët si ky. Betohem.”

In English: “Even if he hides in a mouse hole, this man and traitors like him will eat the bullet. I swear.”

The wording is direct, specific and requires urgent assessment by law-enforcement authorities.

This threat follows an already documented pattern of escalating hostility towards Xhymshiti. On 17 September, another Facebook account circulated a video depicting Xhymshiti alongside Kosovo Foreign Minister Donika Gërvalla while voices described them as “spies”, stated that they would die and referred explicitly to the point on their foreheads where a bullet should strike1. A day earlier, Xhymshiti and Political Editor were subjected to intimidation while reporting outside the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague, where Dutch police ultimately escorted them from the area2.

Frontline Media Group is preserving the relevant screenshots, profile information and associated material and is reporting the matter to the Kosovo Police and competent prosecution authorities. We are calling for the individual behind the account to be identified, the electronic evidence to be secured, the seriousness and immediacy of the threat to be assessed, and any criminal responsibility established through due legal process.

We are also deeply concerned by the limited response from much of Kosovo’s media. Journalists do not need to agree with Xhymshiti’s reporting in order to recognise that an explicit threat involving a bullet against a journalist is a matter of public interest. Kosovo has a documented history of journalists being killed, abducted and attacked, and that history should make every newsroom particularly alert to threats that move from political vilification into explicit language of violence.

We therefore ask Kosovo’s media a simple professional question: does a journalist have to be killed before a public death threat against him becomes news?

Criticism of journalism is legitimate. Disagreement is legitimate. Legal action is legitimate where there is a genuine basis for it. Threatening a journalist with a bullet is not.

calls on the Kosovo Police and prosecution authorities to investigate this matter urgently and lawfully. We also call on Kosovo’s media organisations, journalist associations and relevant public institutions to treat the continuing escalation seriously. Silence in the face of an explicit threat does not protect press freedom. It weakens it.

Frontline Media Group
London
21 September 2026

The video1 is being circulated by the Facebook account “Patriots H Brahimi”. It superimposes photographs of Xhymshiti and Gërvalla and carries the caption “N’ball e kan”, meaning “They have it on their foreheads.”

A male voice says:

“Këta shpiunat n’ballë e kanë t’shkrune shpiun, edhe qashtu kanë me dek, edhe pikë.”

In English:

“These spies have ‘SPY’ written across their foreheads, and that is how they are going to die. Full stop.”

After instrumental music, a female voice says:

“Po qaty ku ju shkrun shpiun n’ballë, e kanë edhe nifar pike, për me kallxu ku me rrok plumi.”

The meaning in English is:

“And right where ‘SPY’ is written on their foreheads, there is also a mark, to show exactly where the bullet should hit them.”

There should be no ambiguity about the Albanian. “Kanë me dek” means “they will die” or “they are going to die”. “Ku me rrok plumi” means “where the bullet should hit/strike”. This is not figurative language inserted by . It is the substance of the language accompanying images of two identifiable people.

The surrounding imagery makes the message still more disturbing. Xhymshiti is shown wearing black gloves and holding what appears to be a blade against his face, while his photograph is superimposed over Gërvalla’s. Their faces are not incidental to the recording. They are its subjects.

The political context

The screenshots2 reviewed by Frontline Media Group show the account publishing material strongly supportive of Hashim Thaçi and other former KLA leaders, including promotional material calling people to a protest “in defence of the KLA” and “in support of the former KLA leaders”.

That establishes an observable political alignment in the material published by the account. It does not, on the evidence presently available, establish that the account holder is formally a member of the Democratic Party of Kosovo, PDK. Frontline Media Group will not convert apparent political support into an unsupported claim of party membership.

What can be documented is more important: an account displaying this political material has circulated a video portraying a British-based journalist and Kosovo’s Foreign Minister as “spies”, declaring that they will die and describing where a bullet should strike them.

The comments show the message being absorbed and amplified

The response underneath the video demonstrates why this material cannot reasonably be dismissed as crude humour3.

Rrh Shehu writes: “Kshyri shpiuni dhe shpiunka...” - “Look at the male spy and the female spy...”

Murat Sefa writes: “Shpiunat e shkiautt” - an ethnic slur effectively describing them as “the Serbs’ spies”.

Nazmi Shehaj, specifically naming our Editor-in-Chief, writes in capitals: “QYRNE GESTAPON VUDI XHYMSHITI JETON ME SHPIUNAZHIN...” - “Look at the Gestapo, Vudi Xhymshiti lives by espionage...”

Naimi Sahiti writes: “Jashtë Kosovës duhet mi dëbuar këta shpiuna” - “These spies should be expelled from Kosovo.”

Halil Neziri writes: “Kurr fara mos ju shtoftë!” - a curse meaning, in context, “May their line/seed never multiply.”

Other comments visible beneath the publication repeat insults including “spy”, “Serbian spy”, “UDbashi” - a reference to the former Yugoslav secret police and similar language portraying the people shown not as legitimate participants in public life, but as enemies and traitors.

This is precisely how dangerous stigmatisation operates.

First, identifiable people are labelled spies and enemies. Then an audiovisual publication says they will die. Then it describes a mark on their foreheads showing where a bullet should hit. The audience is subsequently invited into an environment in which the same “spy” designation is repeated and amplified.

Frontline Media Group therefore considers this an extremely serious journalist-safety incident involving explicit homicidal rhetoric.

We distinguish that conclusion from an allegation that an organised assassination conspiracy has already been proved. It has not. Determining whether particular individuals coordinated an offence, intended violence, solicited violence or committed any criminal offence is a matter for law-enforcement authorities following investigation.

But there is no need to speculate about what the published words themselves mean.

They say Xhymshiti and Gërvalla are spies. They say they will die. They describe a mark on their foreheads. And they say that mark shows where the bullet should hit.

That is alarming enough.

We will pursue accountability

Frontline Media Group is a British media organisation headquartered in London. The targeting of our journalists with death rhetoric will be treated accordingly.

In Britain, we protect journalists. Threats, intimidation and imagery suggesting the shooting of a journalist are not legitimate answers to reporting, investigation or political disagreement.

Frontline Media Group is preserving the original video, screenshots, account information, publication details, comments and other available digital evidence. Relevant material will be made available to the appropriate authorities and journalist-safety organisations so that the origin, dissemination and potential criminal significance of this publication can be properly investigated.

We will leave no stone unturned in establishing who created this material, who knowingly disseminated it, whether its circulation was coordinated, and whether applicable laws have been breached. Where evidence establishes responsibility, we will pursue every lawful avenue to ensure those responsible are dealt with through the law.

No journalist acquires a target on his forehead because somebody objects to his reporting.

No public official becomes legitimate prey because somebody brands her a “spy”.

When a publication places their faces on screen, says they will die, and tells an audience where a bullet should hit them, it has crossed a line that every democratic society should take seriously.

will.

A documented pattern of escalation

The video published on 17 September 2026 did not emerge in isolation. It represents the most explicit violent escalation yet in a sequence Frontline Media Group has been documenting since February.

On 10 June, senior PDK figure Elmi Reçica publicly announced that he had filed a civil lawsuit and criminal complaint against Xhymshiti, falsely alleging threats against himself and his family and repeated defamation. Those were Reçica’s allegations, not judicial findings4.

What followed his announcement is part of the evidential chronology. Frontline Media Group documented5 comments beneath Reçica’s publication branding Xhymshiti an “UDB-ash”, “Serbian spy”, “dog” and “traitor”, alongside comments advocating physical violence and even public hanging. Our June investigation expressly stopped short of alleging that Reçica instructed those commenters. It documented instead how a senior political intervention was followed by precisely the vocabulary of enemy-labelling and punishment that our February investigation6 had warned could create an atmosphere in which violence becomes conceivable.

Three months later, that vocabulary moved from the internet into a physical confrontation.

On 16 September, Xhymshiti and Political Editor were subjected to threats, pushing and intimidation while reporting outside the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague. Dutch police ultimately escorted the journalists from the area7.

During the confrontation, Hysni Gucati, chairman of the KLA War Veterans Organisation, publicly singled out Xhymshiti before the gathered protesters. He described him as a “spy”, accused him of provoking the crowd and repeatedly urged those present not to be influenced by him. Independent video reporting confirms Gucati addressing the crowd about Xhymshiti and telling protesters to stay away from him8.

Then came 17 September.

Within a day, the Facebook account examined in this statement published Xhymshiti’s face alongside Donika Gërvalla’s. Once again the operative word was “spy”. This time, however, the rhetoric crossed into explicit imagery of killing: the voices say the people depicted “will die” and describe a mark on their foreheads showing where the bullet should hit.

That chronology must now be investigated as a whole:

delegitimisation → “Serbian/UDB spy” → demands for punishment → physical confrontation → renewed public branding as a “spy” → explicit language about death and a bullet to the forehead.

Frontline Media Group does not assert that the presently available evidence proves that Reçica, Gucati, the War Veterans Organisation, the PDK, or any other person or organisation ordered or coordinated the 17 September video. Such a conclusion belongs to investigators and ultimately, where appropriate, a court.

What the evidence does establish is a documented continuity of language and escalation around the same journalist. The recurrence of the “spy” designation is particularly significant: what appeared beneath political posts in June was spoken publicly before an agitated crowd on 16 September and appeared the following day in material describing Xhymshiti’s death by gunfire.

That is no longer a collection of insults that responsible authorities can safely examine one by one.

It is an evidential chronology.

Frontline Media Group therefore calls upon the competent authorities in Kosovo, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to preserve the relevant digital evidence, identify the creators and distributors of the 17 September video, establish whether any coordination existed between its production and preceding campaigns of intimidation, and examine whether the successive incidents constitute criminal threats, incitement, harassment or other offences under the applicable jurisdictions.

We are not asking investigators to accept our hypothesis.

We are asking them to follow the evidence.

Because by 17 September the language had travelled an unmistakable distance: from calling a journalist an enemy, to calling him a spy, to confronting him in the street, and finally to describing where a bullet should strike his forehead.

A democratic state should not wait for the bullet before investigating who painted the target.

4

Elmi Reçica and the Senior Political Activation of the Assassination Manual

Our reporting raised a question about who ultimately activates political pressure. On 10 June, Elmi Reçica appeared to answer it.

Gunpowder Chronicles

Elmi Reçica and the Senior Political Activation of the Assassination Manual

The most significant development of 10 June was not that Elmi Reçica filed a lawsuit and criminal complaint against investigative journalist Vudi Xhymshiti. It was that, for the first time since Gunpowder Chronicles published its February investigation into what it described as Hashim Thaçi’s assassination manual, a senior political figure appeared to step forward and publicly assume a central role in the pattern we documented…

Read more

4 months ago · 2 likes · Michael Sheppard and Vudi Xhymshiti

5

Gunpowder Chronicles

Elmi Reçica and the Senior Political Activation of the Assassination Manual

The most significant development of 10 June was not that Elmi Reçica filed a lawsuit and criminal complaint against investigative journalist Vudi Xhymshiti. It was that, for the first time since Gunpowder Chronicles published its February investigation into what it described as Hashim Thaçi’s assassination manual, a senior political figure appeared to step forward and publicly assume a central role in the pattern we documented…

Read more

4 months ago · 2 likes · Michael Sheppard and Vudi Xhymshiti

6

Thaçi’s Assassination Manual

Thaçi’s strategy transformed Kosovo into a coercive state, where “assassination atmospheres” were manufactured to justify neutralising opponents and trapping loyalists in a cycle of debt.

Gunpowder Chronicles

Thaçi’s Assassination Manual

In April 2025 our newsroom began pulling at a thread that kept resurfacing in different forms and different places. It was a claim that a Russian Serbian Kosovan entangled network had been tasked, by Hashim Thaçi and associates, with undermining the Kosovo court process in The Hague. That work started as a national security story and it stayed one. But as we mapped names, timelines and incentives, we kept returning to an older question that Kosovo never fully answered after the war. How did power consolidate so quickly, and what did it cost…

Read more

8 months ago · 3 likes · Vudi Xhymshiti and Michael Sheppard

The Hague, 16 September 2026

Frontline Media Group condemns in the strongest terms the intimidation, threats and physical harassment directed today at our Editor-in-Chief and lead investigative journalist, , and our Political Editor, , while they were carrying out legitimate journalistic work outside the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague.

Xhymshiti and Sheppard travelled to the court to report on the judgment in the case of Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi. They were there as journalists. They did not attend the gathering as protesters, activists or political participants.

As they approached the court, members of the crowd pushed and elbowed them. Concerned for their safety, they contacted court authorities and explained that remaining outside no longer appeared safe.

The situation then escalated.

According to our journalists’ account, Hysni Gucati, chairman of the KLA War Veterans’ Association, recognised Xhymshiti and drew the attention of supporters towards him. A crowd gathered around the two journalists, shouting abuse and attempting to intimidate them. Among the threats reported by our team were statements indicating that Xhymshiti would soon be dead.

Xhymshiti and Sheppard crossed behind Dutch police lines and identified themselves as journalists under threat. Dutch officers immediately intervened, formed a protective cordon around them and ultimately escorted them away from the area after our team concluded that remaining there presented an unacceptable security risk.

Later, speaking to Kanal 10 journalist Kushtrim Sadiku, Gucati publicly called Xhymshiti an “idiot”, a “spy” and a “zero”, claimed that he had come to “provoke” the gathering, and repeatedly instructed supporters to stay away from him.

That attempt to reverse victim and aggressor is unacceptable.

A journalist does not “provoke” a crowd merely by entering a public space to report. A reporter’s previous journalism does not give anybody licence to surround, threaten, abuse or physically intimidate them.

There is a particularly disturbing context. Gucati himself was previously convicted by the Kosovo Specialist Chambers of obstructing official persons, intimidation during criminal proceedings and violating the secrecy of proceedings. His convictions for intimidation and disclosure of protected information were upheld on appeal.

Frontline Media Group’s reporting on the Thaçi proceedings has never been an attack on the Kosovo Liberation Army or Kosovo’s war of liberation.

The distinction matters.

The case before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers is not a trial of whether Kosovo was entitled to resist Serbian repression, nor is it a trial of the KLA as an organisation. The operative indictment charges four individual defendants with crimes against humanity and war crimes, including persecution, imprisonment, torture, murder and enforced disappearance. It alleges a widespread and systematic attack against people suspected of opposing the KLA. The alleged victims included Kosovo Albanians affiliated with the Democratic League of Kosovo, Albanians perceived as opponents, Serbs, Roma, Ashkali and others. The defendants pleaded not guilty.

That distinction has been central to our journalism.

Our newsroom has examined the documentary record, testimony, court filings and historical evidence concerning allegations of violence against political opponents, civilians and others during the period covered by the indictment. Where the evidence supports a conclusion, we report it. Where something remains an allegation, we identify it as such. We do not replace evidence with mythology, whichever side finds the evidence uncomfortable.

Xhymshiti left Kosovo in 2015 after years in which he says he experienced threats and an attempt on his life connected to his investigative work. Since returning to sustained reporting on Kosovo’s post-war political order, he and members of our newsroom have repeatedly faced intimidation, denunciations and accusations portraying critical journalists as “Serbian spies”, “traitors” or enemies of Kosovo.

Our reporting has also scrutinised senior political and former intelligence figures, including individuals associated with the PDK and the former SHIK structures. Frontline Media Group rejects attempts to transform disagreements with that journalism into campaigns of personal vilification or threats. Allegations concerning particular individuals will continue to be published only where we believe the available evidence and public-interest test justify publication.

Today’s incident demonstrates why that distinction matters.

Calling a journalist a “spy” before an already hostile crowd is not serious criticism of journalism. In circumstances where that journalist is simultaneously being surrounded and threatened, such rhetoric can carry obvious and dangerous consequences.

The freedom of the press means very little if journalists may report only when the crowd approves of what they have previously written.

We thank the Dutch police officers who intervened promptly, placed our journalists behind a protective cordon and escorted them from the area. Their intervention prevented an already volatile situation from deteriorating further.

Frontline Media Group is preserving footage, photographs, contemporaneous communications, witness accounts and other material relating to today’s events. We will assess that material with our security and legal advisers and will make the relevant information available to the appropriate Dutch and British authorities where necessary.

Neither intimidation nor political pressure will determine our journalism.

Our journalists will continue reporting on Kosovo, the Specialist Chambers, political violence, alleged abuses of power and the historical record with the same rule that brought us to The Hague in the first place.

No slogans. No mythology. No intimidation.

The record, the evidence and the public interest.

Frontline Media Group
London, United Kingdom

Frontline Media Group i Dënon Kërcënimet ndaj Xhymshitit dhe Sheppardit në Hagë

Policia holandeze përcolli gazetarët e Frontline Media Group nga Haga, pas kërcënimeve dhe frikësimit nga protestuesit gjatë raportimit për Dhomat e Specializuara.

KRONIKAT E BARUTIT

Frontline Media Group i Dënon Kërcënimet ndaj Xhymshitit dhe Sheppardit në Hagë

Hagë, 16 shtator 2026…

Read more

a month ago

There are countless journalism courses around the world.

They teach writing. They teach ethics. They teach media law. They teach how to edit, interview and produce news.

Very few teach what happens after you step off a train in a country you have never visited before, where you know nobody, speak little of the language, and are expected to explain one of the world’s most complex wars to millions of readers.

That is where journalism truly begins.

Not in the classroom.

Not in the newsroom.

But in the field.

For nearly two decades I have reported from countries shaped by armed conflict, political instability and human suffering. I have learned that the greatest challenge facing an international correspondent is rarely writing the story itself. It is finding it.

Every assignment begins with uncertainty.

Who can you trust?

Where do you start?

How do you recognise propaganda?

How do you protect yourself?

How do you approach people who have lost everything without becoming another stranger carrying a camera?

Universities rarely teach these questions.

Editors often expect you already know the answers.

Field School was created to bridge that gap.

This is not a sightseeing trip.

It is not military tourism.

It is not designed to place participants in unnecessary danger.

It is a professional editorial field school built around one principle:

The best way to learn international reporting is by reporting.

Why Ukraine?

Ukraine is one of the most extensively reported conflicts in the world, yet it remains one of the least understood.

It is a country where politics, diplomacy, humanitarian crises, military realities and everyday civilian life intersect on a daily basis. For journalists, it offers an extraordinary opportunity to understand how modern conflict reshapes societies, institutions and ordinary lives.

This programme is not about observing war from a distance.

It is about learning how to report responsibly, ethically and accurately from a country living through historic events.

What Is the Frontline Media Field School?

The Frontline Media Field School is an immersive three-week professional programme that combines online editorial preparation with intensive field reporting in Ukraine.

Designed for aspiring and early-career journalists, photographers, documentary filmmakers, researchers and communications professionals, the programme places participants inside the complete editorial process, from the first idea to the final published story.

Rather than simulating journalism inside a classroom, participants will work through the same decisions, challenges and editorial standards expected of professional international correspondents.

Every participant will develop an original reporting project. Every participant will build sources. Every participant will conduct interviews. Every participant will leave Ukraine having produced original journalism.

Programme Structure

The programme runs over three weeks.

Week One
Participants meet online every second day via Zoom. Together we prepare reporting projects, identify story ideas, build research plans and organise travel to Ukraine.

Week Two
Participants arrive independently in Lviv, where the programme begins with editorial workshops, reporting exercises and source development.

Week Three
Reporting continues in the field. Participants receive daily editorial mentoring while producing their own original journalism from concept to publication.

Founding Cohort

The inaugural Frontline Media Field School is limited to eight participants.

Every accepted participant will become a Founding Member of the Frontline Media Field School and will receive a numbered Founding Cohort Certificate, recognising their place in the programme’s first class.

As the programme grows in the years ahead, the Founding Cohort will remain a permanent part of its history.

A Typical Day

Although every reporting day depends on current events, a typical schedule may include:

• Morning editorial briefing

• Story planning

• Field reporting

• Interviews

• Photography and filming

• Afternoon editorial review

• Writing and editing

• Evening group debrief

Journalism rarely follows a timetable. Participants will learn to adapt professionally as stories evolve.

What You Will Learn

Throughout the programme participants will learn both the editorial and practical skills required of international correspondents.

Topics include:

• Story development.

• Editorial judgement.

• Source building.

• Interview techniques.

• Documentary photography.

• Visual storytelling.

• Mobile journalism.

• Writing compelling long-form features.

• Fact-checking and verification.

• Open-source intelligence fundamentals.

• Digital security.

• Working with local communities.

• Journalism ethics.

• Risk awareness.

• Personal security.

• Publishing workflows.

• Pitching stories to international editors.

Editorial Principles

The Frontline Media Field School is built on the belief that journalism is a public service.

Our objective is not to produce dramatic stories. It is to produce accurate ones.

Throughout the programme, participants will be encouraged to question assumptions, challenge narratives and verify every significant claim before publication. Good reporting is rarely about arriving first. It is about arriving with evidence.

We believe that every interview is built on trust, every photograph carries responsibility, and every published story has consequences for the people whose lives it portrays.

Participants will be expected to uphold the following principles throughout the programme:

• Truth before narrative. Never allow a preconceived story to shape the evidence.

• Verification before publication. Every significant claim should be supported by credible sources or independently verified.

• Humanity before headlines. Respect the dignity, privacy and safety of those who share their stories.

• Independence before influence. Journalism should remain free from political, commercial and ideological pressure.

• Accuracy before speed. It is better to be right than to be first.

• Context before conclusion. Facts gain meaning when they are placed within their proper historical, political and social context.

• Safety before every story. No report is worth risking a life unnecessarily.

The Frontline Media Field School does not teach participants what to think. It teaches them how to investigate, verify and report responsibly so that audiences can make informed judgements based on credible evidence.

This programme is designed not only to develop better reporters, but to strengthen the standards of independent journalism wherever its participants choose to work.

What You Will Produce

Every participant will complete an original journalism project.

Depending on your chosen reporting format, this may include:

• A long-form written feature.

• A documentary photo essay.

• A short documentary film.

• A multimedia report.

• An investigative story.

• An audio feature.

Throughout the programme every project will receive editorial mentoring from idea development through to publication.

Who Should Apply?

This programme is intended for people serious about journalism.

Applicants may include:

• Journalism students.

• Freelance journalists.

• Staff reporters.

• Documentary photographers.

• Filmmakers.

• Human rights researchers.

• NGO communications professionals.

• Researchers interested in international affairs.

• Anyone committed to responsible international reporting.

No previous conflict reporting experience is required.

Curiosity, professionalism and commitment matter far more than experience.

Who Should Not Apply?

This programme is not designed for thrill-seekers.

It is not military tourism.

It is not an opportunity to get close to explosions or frontline combat.

If your motivation is excitement rather than journalism, this programme is not for you.

Conflict reporting is about responsibility.

It is about listening before speaking.

It is about understanding before publishing.

Above all, it is about placing human dignity ahead of headlines.

What This Programme Is Not

This is not a military course.

It is not hostile environment training.

It is not battlefield tourism.

It is not designed for people seeking excitement.

It is a professional journalism programme focused on ethical reporting, critical thinking and editorial judgement.

Safety

Ukraine remains a country at war.

Participants should expect air raid alerts, changing security conditions and logistical disruptions.

The programme is designed around responsible risk management.

Every decision regarding travel, field assignments and reporting locations will be made according to current security assessments, official guidance and the instructor’s professional judgement.

Plans may change at short notice.

Participant safety will always take precedence over editorial ambitions.

Programme Costs

The programme fee covers:

• One week of live online editorial preparation.

• Two weeks of professional field instruction.

• Daily editorial mentoring.

• Individual story development.

• Editorial feedback.

• Certificate of completion.

The programme fee does not include:

• Travel to and from Ukraine.

• Accommodation.

• Meals.

• Travel or medical insurance.

• Personal expenses.

• Visas, where applicable.

• Personal reporting equipment.

Successful applicants will receive recommendations for accommodation, transport and travel planning before arriving in Lviv.

Programme Fee & Scholarships

The Founding Cohort of the Frontline Media Field School is limited to eight participants to ensure close editorial mentorship and individual guidance throughout the programme.

Programme Fee

Founding Cohort Programme Fee: £1,950

The programme fee includes:

• One week of live online editorial preparation.

• Two weeks of intensive field instruction in Ukraine.

• Daily editorial mentoring.

• Individual story development.

• Editorial feedback throughout the programme.

• A Frontline Media Field School Certificate of Completion.

The programme fee does not include international travel, accommodation, meals, travel or medical insurance, visas (where applicable), personal reporting equipment or other personal expenses.

To secure a place, successful applicants will be required to pay a £500 non-refundable deposit upon acceptance. The remaining balance must be paid no later than 15 September 2026.

Founding Scholarship

Frontline Media Group believes that financial circumstances should not prevent exceptional journalists from developing their skills.

For the inaugural programme, one full scholarship will be awarded to an outstanding applicant who demonstrates exceptional promise but would otherwise be unable to participate because of financial hardship.

Applicants wishing to be considered should indicate this within the application form and submit a short personal statement explaining why they are applying for the scholarship.

The scholarship covers the full programme fee only.

Scholarship recipients remain responsible for arranging and covering their own travel, accommodation, meals, insurance and personal expenses.

Selection will be based on journalistic potential, motivation, commitment and the quality of the application.

Meet Your Instructor

I founded Frontline Media Group to produce journalism that explains conflict rather than sensationalises it.

Over the past two decades I have reported from countries affected by war, political instability and humanitarian crises. My work has documented the human consequences of conflict as well as the political decisions that shape it. My reporting and photography have been published by international news organisations including The Guardian, The New York Times, Der Spiegel, Associated Press, Anadolu Agency and others.

Throughout my career I have learned that journalism is far more than collecting information.

It is learning how to earn trust.

How to recognise manipulation.

How to verify competing claims.

How to remain calm when events change without warning.

Most importantly, it is understanding that every person who agrees to speak with a journalist is placing trust in that journalist.

Those lessons cannot be taught through lectures alone.

They are learned in the field.

That is why I created the Frontline Media Field School.

Frequently Asked Questions

Do I need previous conflict reporting experience?

No.

Do I need to speak Ukrainian?

No.

English will be the working language of the programme.

Will we visit active combat areas?

The programme is designed around responsible journalism and dynamic risk assessment. Reporting locations will always depend on the prevailing security situation and professional judgement.

Will I publish my work?

Every participant will complete an original journalism project. Publication opportunities will depend on the quality of the work and editorial suitability.

Is accommodation included?

No. Participants are responsible for arranging and funding their own accommodation, meals, travel, insurance and personal expenses. Following acceptance, Frontline Media Group will provide recommendations for accommodation and practical guidance to help participants organise their stay in Ukraine safely.

Is this physically demanding?

Yes.

Participants should expect long reporting days, extensive walking and changing schedules.

Applications

Applications for the inaugural Frontline Media Field School are now open.

Programme start
20 October 2026 | Programme Fee £1,950

Duration
Three weeks

Format

• One week of online editorial preparation.

• Two weeks of immersive field reporting in Ukraine.

Meeting point
Lviv, Ukraine.

Places are intentionally limited to ensure close mentorship and meaningful editorial guidance throughout the programme.

Every application will be reviewed individually.

Shortlisted applicants will be invited to an online interview before final selection.

Successful applicants will then receive the Programme Handbook, equipment guidance, travel recommendations and further logistical information.

Journalism begins long before the first interview.

It begins with preparation.

It grows through curiosity.

It survives because of discipline.

If you're ready to challenge yourself, report with purpose and learn international journalism from the field, I invite you to submit your application today.

Applications are now open.

Apply Now

Over recent months, readers will have noticed gradual changes across our platforms, including a redesigned logo, updated colour palette and a more refined editorial presentation across our website and social media channels.

The changes are not cosmetic alone. They reflect the evolution of Gunpowder Chronicles into a more focused publication dedicated to rigorous reporting on war, foreign influence, democratic accountability and geopolitical competition.

A New Visual Identity

At the centre of the redesign is our new circular emblem featuring the “GC” monogram against a dark global backdrop. The identity combines archival and investigative aesthetics with a modern editorial structure intended to represent conflict reporting, international affairs and public-interest journalism.

The updated visual language draws inspiration from:

• investigative dossiers

• wartime field reporting

• geopolitical analysis

• European editorial publications

• intelligence and security briefings

The publication’s colour system has also been refined.

Muted archival tones, charcoal blacks and restrained deep reds now form the core visual palette of Gunpowder Chronicles. These colours were selected deliberately to reflect seriousness, clarity and editorial discipline rather than sensationalism.

Typography & Editorial Presentation

We have also updated our typography and layout systems across digital platforms to improve readability and strengthen the publication’s editorial identity.

The revised design balances traditional serif headlines with modern digital typography, reinforcing the combination of long-form investigative reporting and contemporary geopolitical analysis that defines our work.

Why This Matters

Independent journalism depends not only on reporting, but also on trust, clarity and recognisable identity.

As grows, we wanted our visual presentation to better reflect the work we do: frontline reporting, document-based investigations and analysis of the political forces shaping Europe and the wider democratic world.

The redesign represents a clearer expression of who we are: an independent publication reporting from the fault lines of war, power and global influence.

Looking Ahead

This is only the beginning of a broader expansion across our editorial platforms, investigations and multimedia reporting.

In the months ahead, readers can expect:

• expanded investigative coverage

• new geopolitical briefings

• additional regional reporting

• enhanced multimedia storytelling

• deeper analysis on security and foreign influence operations

We remain committed to independent, accountable journalism in the public interest.

Thank you for continuing to read, support and share our work.

— The Editorial Team
& .
www.thegpc.uk

Readers are encouraged to consult the footnotes accompanying this article. They contain supporting documentation, references and evidentiary material related to the claims and reporting presented in the text. The footnotes are provided in the interest of transparency and to allow readers to review the sources and contextual evidence that inform this statement.

, publisher of and its Albanian-language edition , condemns in the strongest terms the third attack on the family home of our chief editor and co-founder, , in Kosovo.

According to information and photographic evidence provided by family members, the house belonging to Mr Xhymshiti’s parents, which is currently unoccupied, was once again forcibly entered. Windows and doors were broken, rooms were disturbed, and personal documents were scattered throughout the property. A desktop computer belonging to Mr Xhymshiti from his school years was removed from its place and found on the staircase, while its hard drive had been taken.

This incident does not resemble an ordinary burglary. No items of material value appear to have been stolen. The disturbance of the property and the removal of the hard drive suggest a deliberate search aimed at accessing personal archives and records.

This marks the third attack on the same property. The first occurred on 11 October 20251, when the house was vandalised in circumstances that pointed clearly to intimidation rather than theft. At the time, international press freedom organisations responded swiftly2. Within Kosovo, however, institutional and public reaction remained limited3.

The repetition of such attacks, particularly in the context of a sustained public campaign of defamation and dehumanising rhetoric directed4 at Mr Xhymshiti following investigative reporting published5 by , raises serious concerns about the safety of journalists and the environment in which independent journalism operates in Kosovo.

When physical intimidation against a journalist’s family property occurs alongside organised public campaigns aimed at discrediting and targeting that journalist, the matter cannot be dismissed as an isolated act of vandalism. It forms part of a broader pattern of pressure intended to silence critical reporting.

The Frontline Media Group calls on the law enforcement and judicial institutions of Kosovo to treat this case with the utmost seriousness. We urge the authorities to conduct a full and transparent investigation, to secure and properly administer all evidence, and to identify and hold accountable those responsible.

We also call on the Association of Journalists of Kosovo and leading newsrooms in the country to recognise that this moment represents a test of professional principle. Editorial disagreements, professional rivalries, or political differences must never justify silence when a journalist faces intimidation, campaigns of dehumanisation, or attacks on family property.

Freedom of the press cannot exist where journalists are turned into targets. Public debate must be conducted with evidence and argument. Accusations require proof. Violence, incitement to violence, and intimidation must never be normalised.

The Frontline Media Group reaffirms its unwavering commitment to independent journalism. Our reporting will continue. Our investigations will continue. And we will continue to document and expose attempts to intimidate journalists or undermine the public’s right to know.

Public accountability is not optional. It is a democratic obligation.

DEKLARATË PUBLIKE

Dënim i sulmit të tretë ndaj shtëpisë familjare të gazetarit Vudi Xhymshiti në Kosovë

Shënim i Redaksisë

Lexuesit inkurajohen t’i konsultojnë fusnotat që e shoqërojnë këtë artikull. Ato përmbajnë dokumentacion mbështetës, referenca dhe materiale dëshmuese që lidhen me pretendimet dhe raportimin e paraqitur në këtë tekst. Fusnotat janë vendosur në interes të transparencës dhe për t’u dhënë lexuesve mundësinë të shqyrtojnë burimet dhe provat kontekstuale që mbështesin këtë deklaratë.

, botues i dhe edicionit të tij në gjuhën shqipe , lëshon këtë deklaratë publike pas sulmit të tretë ndaj shtëpisë familjare të kryeredaktorit dhe bashkëthemelusit tonë, , në Kosovë.

Sipas informacioneve dhe fotografive të dërguara nga familjarët, shtëpia e prindërve të z. Xhymshiti, e cila aktualisht nuk është e banuar, është thyer përsëri. Dritare dhe dyer janë dëmtuar, hapësirat e brendshme janë trazuar dhe dokumente personale janë shpërndarë nëpër dhoma. Një kompjuter desktop, që i përkiste z. Xhymshiti nga koha e shkollës së mesme, është gjetur në shkallë të shtëpisë, ndërsa hard disku i tij është marrë.

Ky incident nuk duket të jetë një vjedhje e zakonshme. Nuk raportohet të jenë marrë sende me vlerë materiale. Mënyra e ndërhyrjes dhe fakti që është marrë hard disku sugjerojnë një kërkim të qëllimshëm për të depërtuar në arkiva personale dhe materiale të ruajtura.

Ky është sulmi i tretë ndaj të njëjtës pronë. Sulmi i parë ndodhi më 11 tetor 20256, kur shtëpia u vandalizua në rrethana që tregonin qartë një akt frikësimi dhe jo një grabitje. Në atë kohë reaguan organizata ndërkombëtare për lirinë e shtypit, ndërsa brenda Kosovës reagimi institucional dhe publik ishte i kufizuar.

Përsëritja e këtyre sulmeve, veçanërisht në një klimë ku ndaj z. Xhymshiti është zhvilluar një fushatë publike diskreditimi dhe dehumanizimi pas publikimeve hulumtuese7 të Gunpowder Chronicles, ngre shqetësime serioze për sigurinë e gazetarëve dhe për mjedisin në të cilin zhvillohet gazetaria e pavarur në Kosovë.

Kur frikësimi fizik ndaj pronës familjare të një gazetari ndodh paralelisht me fushata publike që synojnë delegjitimimin dhe shënjestrimin e tij, rasti nuk mund të trajtohet si incident i izoluar vandalizmi. Ai bëhet pjesë e një modeli më të gjerë presioni që synon heshtjen e raportimit kritik.

The Frontline Media Group u bën thirrje institucioneve të rendit dhe drejtësisë në Kosovë që ta trajtojnë këtë rast me seriozitet maksimal. Autoritetet duhet të zhvillojnë një hetim të plotë dhe transparent, të ruajnë dhe administrojnë provat dhe të identifikojnë e mbajnë përgjegjës autorët.

Njëkohësisht u bëjmë thirrje Asociacionit të Gazetarëve të Kosovës dhe redaksive kryesore në vend që ta kuptojnë këtë moment si një provë standardi profesional. Mospajtimet editoriale, rivalitetet profesionale apo dallimet politike nuk mund të justifikojnë heshtjen kur një gazetar përballet me frikësim, fushata dehumanizimi apo sulme ndaj pronës familjare.

Liria e shtypit nuk mund të ekzistojë aty ku gazetarët shndërrohen në shënjestër. Debati publik duhet të zhvillohet me fakte dhe argumente. Akuzat kërkojnë prova. Dhuna, nxitja e dhunës dhe frikësimi nuk duhet të normalizohen.

The Frontline Media Group rikonfirmon përkushtimin e tij të palëkundur ndaj gazetarisë së pavarur. Raportimi ynë do të vazhdojë. Hulumtimet tona do të vazhdojnë. Dhe ne do të vazhdojmë të dokumentojmë dhe të ekspozojmë çdo përpjekje për të frikësuar gazetarët ose për të minuar të drejtën e publikut për të ditur.

Përgjegjësia publike nuk është sugjerim. Është detyrim.

Following the publication of our investigation on 4 February 20261, which examined mechanisms of power consolidation through intimidation, delegated violence, and narrative engineering, the response did not take the form of factual rebuttal. It came instead as labelling, dehumanisation, fabricated documents, and attempts to criminalise the journalist.

How it all unfolded:

• Feb 4: Thaçi’s Assassination Manual - The GPC I Unit.

• Feb 7: What Happened After the Investigation Was Published — The GPC I Unit.

• Feb 8: The Response That Confirmed the Reporting — The GPC I Unit.

• Feb 9: How an Investigation Triggered a Campaign, Not a Debate — The GPC I Unit.

• Feb 10: Vehbi Kajtazi and the Politics of a Fabricated Espionage List — The GPC I Unit.

• Feb 12: What Happened After Vehbi Kajtazi Turned a Fabricated List into an Espionage Story — The GPC I Unit.

• Feb 23: Decoding Hashim Thaçi’s ‘Assassination Manual’ in Modern Pristina — The GPC Media Watch.

• Feb 23: The Violent Reflexes of Hashim Thaçi’s Dying Political Order — The GPC I Unit.

On 9 and 10 February 2026, the outlet Paparaci and Mr Vehbi Kajtazi published and amplified allegations asserting that was part of an illegal espionage structure. A purported list was presented as institutional output of Kosovo law enforcement authorities, without provenance, without documentary authentication, and without affording a lawful right of reply. The accusations included claims of criminal conduct, impersonation of intelligence structures, and professional fraud.

These allegations are false. They are defamatory under the laws of England and Wales and under the laws of the Republic of Kosovo. They have caused serious reputational and professional harm in multiple jurisdictions, including London and Prishtina. More gravely, they have contributed to the creation of a hostile climate in which risk becomes foreseeable.

Our legal counsel, Ezra Leibowitz, Senior Counsel to Frontline Media Group in London, has issued a formal Notice Before Action to Paparaci and Mr Kajtazi. The notice demands immediate removal of the defamatory material, a full and unequivocal public retraction, a formal apology, disclosure of the source and provenance of the alleged list, and compensation for personal and commercial harm. Failing compliance within seven days, proceedings will be commenced in the High Court of Justice in England and Wales and in the competent courts of the Republic of Kosovo.

We have informed the British Embassy in Pristina, the UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, and the UK Foreign Office of the entirety of this campaign as documented through dated publications and archived evidence. These institutions have been notified not to secure political endorsement, but to ensure visibility and to raise the cost of further escalation against a British journalist and his family.

This matter is not about personal grievance. It is about the boundary between journalism and pressure operations. Freedom of expression is protected. Fabricated allegations of criminality are not. Journalism requires verification, documentation, and accountability. Smear campaigns rely on repetition, ambiguity, and fear.

Following the defamatory publications, a coordinated wave of online hostility unfolded, with hundreds of accounts repeating identical labels and calls for intervention. The family home of Mr Xhymshiti has been attacked and damaged. In a context such as Kosovo, where unresolved political violence remains part of living memory, branding an investigative journalist a spy is not harmless rhetoric. It is a signal.

The public should understand that every stage of this campaign has been documented. Every publication, every broadcast segment, every call for intervention has been archived. Transparency remains our shield.

Regardless of the criminal campaigns designed to intimidate and which are in fact documenting and proving the very fabric of the 4 February investigative findings on the structure of the assassination manual, we will stand and continue to investigate and expose.

Gunpowder Chronicles

Thaçi’s Assassination Manual

In April 2025 our newsroom began pulling at a thread that kept resurfacing in different forms and different places. It was a claim that a Russian Serbian Kosovan entangled network had been tasked, by Hashim Thaçi and associates, with undermining the Kosovo court process in The Hague. That work started as a national security story and it stayed one. But as we mapped names, timelines and incentives, we kept returning to an older question that Kosovo never fully answered after the war. How did power consolidate so quickly, and what did it cost…

Read more

8 months ago · 3 likes · Vudi Xhymshiti and Michael Sheppard

ALBANIAN VERSION

njofton publikun se ka nisur zyrtarisht procedurat për t’i mbajtur përgjegjëse entitetet e organizuara që po e veshin mantelin e gazetarisë dhe që kanë ndërmarrë një fushatë të qëllimshme shpifjesh, trillimesh dhe insinuatash kundër redaksisë sonë dhe kryeredaktorit të saj .

Pas publikimit të gjetjeve tona hulumtuese më 4 shkurt 2026, të cilat ekspozuan mekanizmat e konsolidimit të pushtetit përmes frikësimit, delegimit të dhunës dhe inxhinierisë narrative, reagimi nuk erdhi në formën e kundërargumenteve faktike. Ai erdhi si etiketim, si dehumanizim, si fabrikim dokumentesh dhe si përpjekje për ta kriminalizuar gazetarin.

RRJEDHA E NGJARJEVE

• 4 Shkurt: Skema e vrasjeve politike të Hashim Thaçit — Kronika B Hulumtim.

• 5 Shkurt: Kur e vërteta kthehet në provë kundër pushtetit vrastar të Hashim Thaçit — Kronika B Koment dhe Analizë.

• 5 Shkurt: Si Reagon Manuali i Hashim Thaçit Kur Ekspozohet — Kronika B Lajme dhe Raportim.

• 6 Shkurt: OVL-ja po Bërtet për ta Mbytur të Vërtetën — Kronika B Politikë.

• 7 Shkurt: Reagimet që Konfirmuan Gjetjet Tona Hulumtuese — Kronika B Lajme dhe Raportim.

• 8 Shkurt: Reagimi që e konfirmoi raportimin tonë — Kronika B Lajme dhe Raportim.

• 10 Shkurt: Pse Faktet Tronditën Median e Kosovës — Kronika B Koment dhe Analizë.

• 10 Shkurt: Vehbi Kajtazi dhe Politika e një Liste të Fabrikuar Spiunazhi — Kronika B Politikë.

  ---

Më 9 dhe 10 shkurt 2026, portali Paparaci dhe z. Vehbi Kajtazi publikuan dhe i dhanë jehonë pretendimeve se ishte pjesë e një strukture të paligjshme spiunazhi. U prezantua një listë e pretenduar si produkt institucional i autoriteteve të rendit në Kosovë, pa verifikim të dokumentuar dhe pa të drejtë përgjigjeje paraprake. Pretendimet përfshinin akuza për kriminalitet, përvetësim strukturash inteligjence dhe mashtrim profesional.

Këto pretendime janë të rreme. Ato përbëjnë shpifje sipas legjislacionit të Mbretërisë së Bashkuar dhe të Republikës së Kosovës. Ato kanë shkaktuar dëm serioz reputacional dhe profesional në disa juridiksione, përfshirë Londrën dhe Prishtinën. Më e rëndësishmja, ato kanë kontribuar në krijimin e një klime armiqësore ku rreziku për jetën bëhet i parashikueshëm.

Këshilltarja jonë ligjore, Ezra Leibowitz, nga në Londër, ka dërguar një “Njoftim Para Veprimit” ndaj Paparacit dhe z. Kajtazi. Në këtë njoftim kërkohet heqja e menjëhershme e materialeve shpifëse, një tërheqje publike e plotë dhe e pakushtëzuar, një ndjesë zyrtare, zbulimi i burimit dhe origjinës së listës së pretenduar, si dhe kompenzim për dëmin personal dhe komercial të shkaktuar. Në mungesë të reagimit brenda shtatë ditëve, do të iniciohen procedura në Gjykatën e Lartë të Drejtësisë në Angli dhe Wales, si dhe në gjykatat kompetente të Republikës së Kosovës.

Ne e kemi informuar Ambasadën Britanike në Prishtinë, Komisionin për Punë të Jashtme të Parlamentit të Mbretërisë së Bashkuar dhe Ministrinë e Punëve të Jashtme në Londër për tërësinë e kësaj fushate, ashtu siç është dokumentuar me prova, data dhe arkiva publike. Këto institucione janë njoftuar jo për të kërkuar mbështetje politike, por për të ngritur koston e çdo përshkallëzimi të mëtejshëm kundër një gazetari britanik me origjinë kosovare dhe pronës private të familjes së tij në Kosovë.

Kjo çështje nuk ka të bëjë me krenari personale. Ajo ka të bëjë me kufirin mes gazetarisë dhe operacionit të presionit. Liria e shprehjes është e garantuar. Shpifja e fabrikuar nuk është. Gazetaria kërkon verifikim, dokumentim dhe përgjegjësi. Fushata e shpifjes kërkon mjegull, përsëritje dhe frikë.

Pas publikimeve shpifëse u shënua një valë e koordinuar armiqësie në internet, me qindra llogari që përsëritën të njëjtat etiketime dhe thirrje për ndërhyrje. Shtëpia familjare e z. Xhymshiti është sulmuar dhe dëmtuar përsëri. Në një kontekst si ai i Kosovës, ku vrasjet politike të pazbardhura mbeten plagë të hapura, shpallja e një gazetari si spiun nuk është retorikë e pafajshme. Është sinjal.

Publiku duhet ta dijë se ne e kemi dokumentuar çdo hap të kësaj fushate. Çdo publikim, çdo video, çdo thirrje për ndërhyrje (jo formale) institucionale është arkivuar dhe ruajtur. Transparenca është mburoja jonë.

Pavarësisht fushatave kriminale të dizajnuara për të frikësuar dhe që në fakt po i dokumentojnë dhe po i vërtetojnë gjetjet tona hulumtuese të 4 shkurtit mbi vetë strukturën e manualit të asgjësimit, ne do të qëndrojmë dhe do të vazhdojmë të hulumtojmë dhe të ekspozojmë.

167-169 Great Portland Street (5th Floor)
London, W1W 5PF, United Kingdom

1

Thaçi’s Assassination Manual

Thaçi’s strategy transformed Kosovo into a coercive state, where “assassination atmospheres” were manufactured to justify neutralising opponents and trapping loyalists in a cycle of debt. — The GPC I Unit.

KRONIKAT E BARUTIT

Skema e vrasjeve politike të Hashim Thaçit

Në prill 2025 redaksia jonë u përball me një përpjekje për të na futur në një kurth të ndërtuar si honeytrap, me synimin për të prodhuar kompromat kundër nesh. Në vend që të tërhiqeshim, hulumtuam pse po ndodhte kjo. Ajo që zbuluam ishte e qartë dhe e rrezikshme, një rrjet i ndërthurur ruso serbo kosovar ishte vënë në lëvizje me nxitje të…

Read more

8 months ago · 11 likes · 1 comment · Vudi Xhymshiti and Michael Sheppard

The outlet was established under the by investigative journalist and war reporter , whose professional background spans more than eighteen years of reporting on armed conflicts, political corruption and information warfare across the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The editorial foundation of Kronikat e Barutit drew directly from this experience, combining investigative depth with contextual analysis and a strict adherence to journalistic integrity. In its earliest weeks, the publication focused on exposing disinformation, foreign interference and the erosion of media standards in Kosovo and the wider region, while also addressing social, cultural, economic, health and justice issues through rigorous reporting rather than opinion driven noise.

During its initial months in late summer and autumn 2024, Kronikat e Barutit began building its audience organically through direct reader subscriptions rather than advertising or sponsored content. This choice reflected a strategic commitment to independence and reader accountability. Early growth was steady, driven by trust and word of mouth rather than algorithmic amplification. By the end of 2024, the outlet had already demonstrated that there was a substantial audience willing to support fact based journalism financially and morally. The first paid subscribers joined during this period, laying the groundwork for a sustainable reader funded model.

In early 2025, the publication entered a phase of accelerated development. Investigative pieces addressing corruption, foreign influence and media manipulation gained significant traction, resulting in a consistent increase in both free and paid subscribers. Revenue growth followed a clear upward trajectory throughout the first half of the year, reflecting not only expanding reach but also strong reader confidence in the editorial mission. By mid year, the publication had moved from modest monthly income to a stable and growing annualised revenue base, demonstrating the viability of independent journalism supported directly by its audience.

By the final quarter of the year, Kronikat e Barutit reached a significant milestone. Gross annualised revenue stood at 9,949 US dollars, generated by 121 paid subscribers within a total subscriber base of 1,537 readers. This growth was not only financial but also geographical. The audience expanded across seventeen states and forty countries, with a strong concentration in Kosovo, which accounted for approximately one third of subscribers. Significant readership also developed in Germany, Switzerland, Serbia and the United Kingdom, reflecting the strong engagement of the Albanian diaspora and international readers seeking credible reporting on the region.

Audience loyalty and trust were further confirmed by exceptionally strong retention metrics. One month paid retention reached 96.43 percent, six month retention stood at 83.93 percent and twelve month retention reached 91.67 percent, figures that indicate sustained reader satisfaction and long term commitment. Cohort analysis throughout the year showed that most subscriber groups maintained high retention well beyond the initial subscription period, underlining the strength of the relationship between the publication and its readers. Paid churn remained consistently low, reinforcing the conclusion that the audience values depth, accuracy and independence over volume or sensationalism.

Equally important to quantitative growth was the qualitative feedback received from readers. Subscriber messages throughout the year repeatedly highlighted trust, accuracy, courage and professionalism as the defining qualities of Kronikat e Barutit. Many readers explicitly stated that their decision to subscribe was motivated by a desire to counter fake news, support investigative journalism and protect the public right to truthful information. These messages, coming from both paid and pledged supporters, form part of the public record of the outlet and reflect a community built around shared democratic values rather than passive consumption.

By the end of the reporting year, Kronikat e Barutit had established itself as a credible and influential Albanian language media outlet with more than 150,000 monthly views. Its development from a newly founded publication into a reader supported platform with international reach demonstrates both the demand for independent journalism and the effectiveness of a model rooted in transparency and accountability. Chronologically, the year reflects a clear progression from foundation and mission definition, through audience trust building, to measurable financial sustainability and editorial impact.

This end of year record confirms that Kronikat e Barutit is not an episodic project but a growing institution within the Albanian media landscape. Its continued existence is anchored in reader support, professional integrity and a commitment to exposing truth in an increasingly hostile information environment. The year closes with a stable foundation, a loyal audience and a clear mandate to continue investigative reporting in the public interest without compromise.

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Our reply is structured point by point, in the public interest and in defence of our professional integrity.

KRONIKAT E BARUTIT

Të përkushtuar ndaj parimeve të pavarësisë editoriale dhe cilësisë së raportimit, ne ju informojmë dhe edukojmë mbi narrativat që minojnë vlerat demokratike dhe sigurinë kombëtare.

By Vudi Xhymshiti

1. On our sources and the nature of the allegation

Ms Qefalija describes our work as “shamelessness up to the level of a crime”, and portrays it as the product of a “sick mind” driven by malice and conspiracy.

For the avoidance of doubt:

• Our reporting2 on the alleged assaults against Mr Zeka is based on a triangulated set of independent international sources, including individuals with direct knowledge of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and of related security environments.

• These are not casual online rumours, but interlocutors whose reliability has been tested over time and whose information has been cross-checked against documents and prior reporting.

In the article we do not present the reported beatings and sexual abuse as established facts. We explicitly treat them as serious allegations which:

• have been reported to us by credible sources,

• are consistent with a longer pattern of pressure, manipulation and risk in and around this network,

• and therefore require scrutiny, not silence.

We also took the basic professional step of affording Mr Zeka a right of reply:

• On 10 November 2025 and again on 12 November 2025, The Gunpowder Chronicles wrote to Mr Zeka asking:

  • whether he had recently been subjected to physical violence,

  • whether any such incident had been reported to police or other competent authorities,

  • and inviting him to respond by written statement or recorded interview.

• Technical checks confirm that our emails were received and opened.

• Mr Zeka chose not to respond.

Having fulfilled our duty to seek comment from the subject of serious allegations, we proceeded to publication, clearly distinguishing between what is alleged, what is documented, and what remains to be independently verified.

2. On the claim that we are accusing “people of Hashim Thaçi” of beating witnesses

Ms Qefalija suggests that our article conveniently serves “those who want the KLA in The Hague, preferably convicted”, and she paraphrases our work as saying:

“The people of Hashim [Thaçi] are beating and raping those who testify in The Hague.”

This is a distortion of what we actually wrote.

• We reported that our sources believe the assaults against Mr Zeka are linked to his earlier role as a witness and accuser in processes which contributed to the sending of Mr Thaçi and other former KLA leaders to the Kosovo Specialist Chambers.

• We did not state that all “people of Hashim Thaçi” are beating or raping witnesses, nor did we generalise beyond the specific allegations under discussion.

Our article situates these allegations within a well-documented, complex history, including:

• A 2021 letter from Mr Zeka to the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, in which he levels extensive accusations at Mr Thaçi and other figures3;

• His earlier public attacks on Mr Thaçi and on EULEX;

• His subsequent involvement in campaigns to discredit the Specialist Chambers and key figures associated with it;

• And his cooperation with individuals whom our previous investigations have linked to Serbian and Russian intelligence-related operations.

We describe a contradictory, shifting trajectory, not a simple slogan.

3. On Ms Qefalija’s medical explanation and the visible bruise

Ms Qefalija states that:

“On 24 October 2025, Mr Milaim Zeka underwent facial surgery by surgeon Ngadhnjim Domi to remove a large, suspected cancerous mass… The mark on his face is postoperative and will remain visible for a long time. If he had been beaten as Vudi claims, the bruising would long since have faded.”

We respond as follows:

1. We did not claim that the visible bruise on Mr Zeka’s right upper cheek is definitively the result of an assault.

   • In the article, we clearly note that we cannot confirm that this bruising is directly related to the alleged physical and sexual violence.

   • We describe it as circumstantial and worthy of questions, not as conclusive proof.

2. Prior to publication, we consulted medical professionals, including surgeons, based on the publicly available TV footage.

   • Their view was that the mark more closely resembled blunt-force bruising than a typical post-surgical scar, and that the level and style of make-up coverage visible on air would be unusual so soon after facial surgery involving sutures.

   • Naturally, none of them could provide a categorical conclusion without examining the patient or reviewing medical documentation.

3. Ms Qefalija has now posted select photographs on Facebook and asserts that they “prove” her husband was not assaulted.

   • As a professional newsroom, we cannot give such social-media materials the same evidential weight as primary documentation unless:

     • we are provided with the original, uncompressed image files (RAW or equivalent) for forensic analysis,

     • we receive full medical reports in official form,

     • and we are permitted to seek direct confirmation from the named surgeon and/or medical institution.

If Ms Qefalija is prepared to provide this material to our newsroom in London, we will:

• examine it rigorously,

• seek independent medical opinion,

• and, where appropriate, update, clarify or correct our reporting.

Until then, her explanation remains an unverified assertion by an interested party, made only after Mr Zeka declined to engage with us directly when invited to do so.

Our investigative unit is reachable via investigations[at]thegpc.uk.

4. On the Moynihan report and the credibility of testimonies

Ms Qefalija portrays herself and her husband as unfairly attacked and implies that our work is baseless.

One of the central documents in the public domain which informs our reporting is the 118-page “whistleblower complaint” drafted by former US investigator John F. Moynihan4.

• That report draws extensively on material and claims provided by:

  • Mr Milaim Zeka,

  • Ms Edlira Qefalija,

  • Mr Halit Sahitaj,

  • and Mr Darko Perovic.

It is therefore particularly significant that within his own report, Mr Moynihan states (around pages 13–14) that:

• he cannot fully trust the testimonies coming from Mr Zeka, Ms Qefalija and their close associates (i.e: Darko Perovic and Halit Sahitaj),

• the information provided does not meet his own standards of credibility,

• and he raises doubts about potential manipulation and fabrication.

We have not invented this. We simply note that the very investigator whose report they have used as a political weapon has, in that same document, questioned their reliability.

5. On links to Serbian and Russian intelligence-related networks

Our previous investigations, published earlier this year, have set out in detail a broader network around Mr Zeka which Ms Qefalija does not address.

In summary:

• Mr Darko Perovic5 is described by multiple security-linked sources as a Montenegrin-born operative with past ties to Serbian state security structures.

• Mr Halit Sahitaj6 appears, on the basis of documentary evidence and witness accounts, to have acted as an operator aligned with Russian state interests, including in cases relating to attacks or threats against Russian anti-Putin activists in Europe.

• This network intersects with:

  • campaigns to attack and discredit the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and its prosecutors,

  • pro-Belgrade narratives in the Albanian-language media space,

  • and attempts to shape political and parliamentary outcomes in Kosovo through fabricated audio recordings, kompromat and orchestrated disinformation.

We are careful in our wording:

• We distinguish between what documents show, what sources state, and what we infer,

• and we provide references and context wherever security and legal constraints allow.

Ms Qefalija offers no documentary counter-evidence to this body of investigative work. She elects instead to attack motives and character.

6. On alleged “obsession” and our motives

Ms Qefalija claims that:

“For more than two or three years, Vudi has been madly ‘in love’ with Milaim, to the point of near-stalking… I sometimes wonder whether I love my husband more, or Vudi does.”

She further suggests that our interest is rooted in personal obsession rather than public-interest journalism.

The factual position is as follows:

• Our newsroom began examining Mr Zeka’s activities in depth after February 2025, when his associate Mr Halit Sahitaj approached us and, according to our contemporaneous notes and messages, attempted to push fabricated material – including claims about alleged Russian-linked payments via cryptocurrency – in relation to Richard Grenell and others7.

• In the course of assessing those approaches, we uncovered:

  • the Moynihan complaint and its internal contradictions,

  • Mr Zeka’s shifting roles as accuser, intermediary and later attacker of the Specialist Chambers8,

  • the use of his media platforms to launder narratives favourable to Mr Thaçi and to external actors,

  • and evidence of a wider influence-operations ecosystem around him.

Our sustained focus on Mr Zeka therefore arises from:

• his self-appointed role in matters of justice and national security,

• the scale and seriousness of the claims he has made about the court, prosecutors and political actors,

• and the risks to Kosovo’s democratic discourse when such a figure operates without proper scrutiny.

It is not a matter of personal “love”, “obsession” or fixation. It is a matter of public interest.

7. On sexuality, privacy and relevance

Ms Qefalija accuses us of indulging in fantasies about “beatings, rape, homosexuality and the like”, and implies that by mentioning such issues we reveal our own “personal affinities”.

For clarity:

• We do not concern ourselves with the private, consensual relationships of adults as a moral issue.

• We have, however, reported on a close personal and operational relationship between Mr Zeka and Mr Sahitaj9, where:

  • that relationship intersects with joint activities in disinformation and political manipulation, and

  • stands in stark contrast to Mr Zeka’s own public attacks10 on members of the LGBT community.

Where an individual publicly targets a vulnerable community while privately engaging in conduct they themselves weaponise against others, and where that conduct is tied directly to joint political operations, the matter becomes one of legitimate public interest.

We do not criminalise or mock sexuality. We expose hypocrisy and operational collusion where they intersect with foreign-aligned influence campaigns.

8. On Ms Qefalija’s photographs and her claim of “proof”

Ms Qefalija writes:

“I am now proving with photos that no one has beaten Milaim… the mark on his face is postoperative and will remain there for some time.”

As already noted:

• Photographs posted on Facebook, without verifiable metadata, provenance, or proper forensic handling, do not automatically constitute conclusive proof in a journalistic or legal sense.

• They may be relevant, but they must be subject to technical and contextual verification.

We therefore reiterate our invitation to Ms Qefalija to:

1. Provide the original, uncompressed image files (not screenshots or edited uploads) showing Mr Zeka before and after the supposed operation;

2. Supply official medical documentation relating to the surgery, including diagnosis, procedure and follow-up;

3. Authorise the named surgeon and/or hospital to respond to a limited set of factual questions from our newsroom.

Upon receipt of such material, we will:

• submit it to technical forensic review,

• obtain independent medical assessments,

• and, if it materially changes the picture, publish clarifications, corrections or retractions as our editorial standards require.

Unless and until that happens, her publicly posted photographs do not erase:

• the existence of a triangulated set of credible sources describing serious assaults,

• the documented pattern of risk, manipulation and pressure around this network,

• and Mr Zeka’s clear decision not to answer our direct questions before publication.

9. On process, openness and next steps

Finally, Ms Qefalija chose to respond via a public Facebook post rather than by contacting our newsroom in London.

We note that:

• Prior to publication, we sought comment from Mr Zeka twice and received no response.

• In earlier phases of our work, we indicated a willingness to speak with Ms Qefalija; this offer was not taken up.

Our position remains consistent:

• We stand by our investigation of 27 November 2025 as a fair, well-sourced and carefully qualified piece of reporting.

• We remain open to verifiable new evidence from any party, including Ms Qefalija and Mr Zeka.

• If such evidence materially contradicts any element of our reporting, we will not hesitate to update, correct or, where necessary, retract specific points.

What we cannot accept is the notion that insults, personalised attacks and unsubstantiated assertions on social media should outweigh:

• corroborated sources,

• documentary records,

• and a year-long body of investigative work on networks that seek to bend Kosovo’s institutions and public debate towards the interests of former war-time elites, foreign intelligence services and transnational criminal structures.

Frontline Media Group
Publisher of The Gunpowder Chronicles and Kronikat e Barutit
London, 28 November 2025

Gunpowder Chronicles

The Man Who Knew Too Much What Happened To Milaim Zeka

The man who once claimed to expose everyone else is now the one disappearing behind dark glasses and thick make-up…

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a year ago · 3 likes · 1 comment · Michael Sheppard and Vudi Xhymshiti