Setting the Record Straight: Our Response to Ms Qefalija’s Claims
Frontline Media / The Gunpowder Chronicles Statement in Response to Ms Edlira Qefalija’s Remarks of 28 November 2025.
The Frontline Media Group, publisher of The Gunpowder Chronicles and Kronikat e Barutit, issues the following response to the Facebook statement1 made today by Ms Edlira Qefalija, wife and collaborator of Mr Milaim Zeka, concerning our investigation “Kush po e torturon Milaim Zekën? Fijet çojnë te njerëzit e Hashim Thaçit” published on 27 November 2025.
Our reply is structured point by point, in the public interest and in defence of our professional integrity.
1. On our sources and the nature of the allegation
Ms Qefalija describes our work as “shamelessness up to the level of a crime”, and portrays it as the product of a “sick mind” driven by malice and conspiracy.
For the avoidance of doubt:
Our reporting2 on the alleged assaults against Mr Zeka is based on a triangulated set of independent international sources, including individuals with direct knowledge of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and of related security environments.
These are not casual online rumours, but interlocutors whose reliability has been tested over time and whose information has been cross-checked against documents and prior reporting.
In the article we do not present the reported beatings and sexual abuse as established facts. We explicitly treat them as serious allegations which:
have been reported to us by credible sources,
are consistent with a longer pattern of pressure, manipulation and risk in and around this network,
and therefore require scrutiny, not silence.
We also took the basic professional step of affording Mr Zeka a right of reply:
On 10 November 2025 and again on 12 November 2025, The Gunpowder Chronicles wrote to Mr Zeka asking:
whether he had recently been subjected to physical violence,
whether any such incident had been reported to police or other competent authorities,
and inviting him to respond by written statement or recorded interview.
Technical checks confirm that our emails were received and opened.
Mr Zeka chose not to respond.
Having fulfilled our duty to seek comment from the subject of serious allegations, we proceeded to publication, clearly distinguishing between what is alleged, what is documented, and what remains to be independently verified.
2. On the claim that we are accusing “people of Hashim Thaçi” of beating witnesses
Ms Qefalija suggests that our article conveniently serves “those who want the KLA in The Hague, preferably convicted”, and she paraphrases our work as saying:
“The people of Hashim [Thaçi] are beating and raping those who testify in The Hague.”
This is a distortion of what we actually wrote.
We reported that our sources believe the assaults against Mr Zeka are linked to his earlier role as a witness and accuser in processes which contributed to the sending of Mr Thaçi and other former KLA leaders to the Kosovo Specialist Chambers.
We did not state that all “people of Hashim Thaçi” are beating or raping witnesses, nor did we generalise beyond the specific allegations under discussion.
Our article situates these allegations within a well-documented, complex history, including:
A 2021 letter from Mr Zeka to the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, in which he levels extensive accusations at Mr Thaçi and other figures3;
His earlier public attacks on Mr Thaçi and on EULEX;
His subsequent involvement in campaigns to discredit the Specialist Chambers and key figures associated with it;
And his cooperation with individuals whom our previous investigations have linked to Serbian and Russian intelligence-related operations.
We describe a contradictory, shifting trajectory, not a simple slogan.
3. On Ms Qefalija’s medical explanation and the visible bruise
Ms Qefalija states that:
“On 24 October 2025, Mr Milaim Zeka underwent facial surgery by surgeon Ngadhnjim Domi to remove a large, suspected cancerous mass… The mark on his face is postoperative and will remain visible for a long time. If he had been beaten as Vudi claims, the bruising would long since have faded.”
We respond as follows:
We did not claim that the visible bruise on Mr Zeka’s right upper cheek is definitively the result of an assault.
In the article, we clearly note that we cannot confirm that this bruising is directly related to the alleged physical and sexual violence.
We describe it as circumstantial and worthy of questions, not as conclusive proof.
Prior to publication, we consulted medical professionals, including surgeons, based on the publicly available TV footage.
Their view was that the mark more closely resembled blunt-force bruising than a typical post-surgical scar, and that the level and style of make-up coverage visible on air would be unusual so soon after facial surgery involving sutures.
Naturally, none of them could provide a categorical conclusion without examining the patient or reviewing medical documentation.
Ms Qefalija has now posted select photographs on Facebook and asserts that they “prove” her husband was not assaulted.
As a professional newsroom, we cannot give such social-media materials the same evidential weight as primary documentation unless:
we are provided with the original, uncompressed image files (RAW or equivalent) for forensic analysis,
we receive full medical reports in official form,
and we are permitted to seek direct confirmation from the named surgeon and/or medical institution.
If Ms Qefalija is prepared to provide this material to our newsroom in London, we will:
examine it rigorously,
seek independent medical opinion,
and, where appropriate, update, clarify or correct our reporting.
Until then, her explanation remains an unverified assertion by an interested party, made only after Mr Zeka declined to engage with us directly when invited to do so.
Our investigative unit is reachable via investigations[at]thegpc.uk.
4. On the Moynihan report and the credibility of testimonies
Ms Qefalija portrays herself and her husband as unfairly attacked and implies that our work is baseless.
One of the central documents in the public domain which informs our reporting is the 118-page “whistleblower complaint” drafted by former US investigator John F. Moynihan4.
That report draws extensively on material and claims provided by:
Mr Milaim Zeka,
Ms Edlira Qefalija,
Mr Halit Sahitaj,
and Mr Darko Perovic.
It is therefore particularly significant that within his own report, Mr Moynihan states (around pages 13–14) that:
he cannot fully trust the testimonies coming from Mr Zeka, Ms Qefalija and their close associates (i.e: Darko Perovic and Halit Sahitaj),
the information provided does not meet his own standards of credibility,
and he raises doubts about potential manipulation and fabrication.
We have not invented this. We simply note that the very investigator whose report they have used as a political weapon has, in that same document, questioned their reliability.
5. On links to Serbian and Russian intelligence-related networks
Our previous investigations, published earlier this year, have set out in detail a broader network around Mr Zeka which Ms Qefalija does not address.
In summary:
Mr Darko Perovic5 is described by multiple security-linked sources as a Montenegrin-born operative with past ties to Serbian state security structures.
Mr Halit Sahitaj6 appears, on the basis of documentary evidence and witness accounts, to have acted as an operator aligned with Russian state interests, including in cases relating to attacks or threats against Russian anti-Putin activists in Europe.
This network intersects with:
campaigns to attack and discredit the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and its prosecutors,
pro-Belgrade narratives in the Albanian-language media space,
and attempts to shape political and parliamentary outcomes in Kosovo through fabricated audio recordings, kompromat and orchestrated disinformation.
We are careful in our wording:
We distinguish between what documents show, what sources state, and what we infer,
and we provide references and context wherever security and legal constraints allow.
Ms Qefalija offers no documentary counter-evidence to this body of investigative work. She elects instead to attack motives and character.
6. On alleged “obsession” and our motives
Ms Qefalija claims that:
“For more than two or three years, Vudi has been madly ‘in love’ with Milaim, to the point of near-stalking… I sometimes wonder whether I love my husband more, or Vudi does.”
She further suggests that our interest is rooted in personal obsession rather than public-interest journalism.
The factual position is as follows:
Our newsroom began examining Mr Zeka’s activities in depth after February 2025, when his associate Mr Halit Sahitaj approached us and, according to our contemporaneous notes and messages, attempted to push fabricated material – including claims about alleged Russian-linked payments via cryptocurrency – in relation to Richard Grenell and others7.
In the course of assessing those approaches, we uncovered:
the Moynihan complaint and its internal contradictions,
Mr Zeka’s shifting roles as accuser, intermediary and later attacker of the Specialist Chambers8,
the use of his media platforms to launder narratives favourable to Mr Thaçi and to external actors,
and evidence of a wider influence-operations ecosystem around him.
Our sustained focus on Mr Zeka therefore arises from:
his self-appointed role in matters of justice and national security,
the scale and seriousness of the claims he has made about the court, prosecutors and political actors,
and the risks to Kosovo’s democratic discourse when such a figure operates without proper scrutiny.
It is not a matter of personal “love”, “obsession” or fixation. It is a matter of public interest.
7. On sexuality, privacy and relevance
Ms Qefalija accuses us of indulging in fantasies about “beatings, rape, homosexuality and the like”, and implies that by mentioning such issues we reveal our own “personal affinities”.
For clarity:
We do not concern ourselves with the private, consensual relationships of adults as a moral issue.
We have, however, reported on a close personal and operational relationship between Mr Zeka and Mr Sahitaj9, where:
that relationship intersects with joint activities in disinformation and political manipulation, and
stands in stark contrast to Mr Zeka’s own public attacks10 on members of the LGBT community.
Where an individual publicly targets a vulnerable community while privately engaging in conduct they themselves weaponise against others, and where that conduct is tied directly to joint political operations, the matter becomes one of legitimate public interest.
We do not criminalise or mock sexuality. We expose hypocrisy and operational collusion where they intersect with foreign-aligned influence campaigns.
8. On Ms Qefalija’s photographs and her claim of “proof”
Ms Qefalija writes:
“I am now proving with photos that no one has beaten Milaim… the mark on his face is postoperative and will remain there for some time.”
As already noted:
Photographs posted on Facebook, without verifiable metadata, provenance, or proper forensic handling, do not automatically constitute conclusive proof in a journalistic or legal sense.
They may be relevant, but they must be subject to technical and contextual verification.
We therefore reiterate our invitation to Ms Qefalija to:
Provide the original, uncompressed image files (not screenshots or edited uploads) showing Mr Zeka before and after the supposed operation;
Supply official medical documentation relating to the surgery, including diagnosis, procedure and follow-up;
Authorise the named surgeon and/or hospital to respond to a limited set of factual questions from our newsroom.
Upon receipt of such material, we will:
submit it to technical forensic review,
obtain independent medical assessments,
and, if it materially changes the picture, publish clarifications, corrections or retractions as our editorial standards require.
Unless and until that happens, her publicly posted photographs do not erase:
the existence of a triangulated set of credible sources describing serious assaults,
the documented pattern of risk, manipulation and pressure around this network,
and Mr Zeka’s clear decision not to answer our direct questions before publication.
9. On process, openness and next steps
Finally, Ms Qefalija chose to respond via a public Facebook post rather than by contacting our newsroom in London.
We note that:
Prior to publication, we sought comment from Mr Zeka twice and received no response.
In earlier phases of our work, we indicated a willingness to speak with Ms Qefalija; this offer was not taken up.
Our position remains consistent:
We stand by our investigation of 27 November 2025 as a fair, well-sourced and carefully qualified piece of reporting.
We remain open to verifiable new evidence from any party, including Ms Qefalija and Mr Zeka.
If such evidence materially contradicts any element of our reporting, we will not hesitate to update, correct or, where necessary, retract specific points.
What we cannot accept is the notion that insults, personalised attacks and unsubstantiated assertions on social media should outweigh:
corroborated sources,
documentary records,
and a year-long body of investigative work on networks that seek to bend Kosovo’s institutions and public debate towards the interests of former war-time elites, foreign intelligence services and transnational criminal structures.
Frontline Media Group
Publisher of The Gunpowder Chronicles and Kronikat e Barutit
London, 28 November 2025
Edlira Qefalija Facebook Post, Nov 28, 2025.
🇬🇧 The Man Who Knew Too Much What Happened To Milaim Zeka
Once the man exposing everyone else, Milaim Zeka now moves through Pristina in shadows, bruised, silent, and ringed by rumours of beatings and betrayal today. — The GPC I Unit.
🇦🇱 Kush po e torturon Milaim Zekën? Fijet çojnë te njerëzit e Hashim Thaçit
Milaim Zeka doli në ekran i maskuar, por burimet tona thonë se njerëzit e Hashim Thaçit e kanë rrahur brutalisht dy herë, për shkak të dëshmive të tij në Hagë kundër tij. — Kronika B Hulumtim.
Inside the Plot to Dismantle Kosovo’s War Crimes Tribunal
How a simple Facebook bribe unravelled into a scandal, unveiling a clandestine effort to sabotage Kosovo’s Special Chambers and destabilise a nation. — The GPC I Unit.
Double Dealing: A Journalist, a Fixer, and a Master of Manipulation
Unveiling Milaim Zeka’s role in manipulating Kosovo’s narrative, targeting the KSC in The Hague with a campaign of disinformation and deceit utilising Russian secret service assets and criminal ties. — The GPC I Unit.
Sex, Lies, and Kompromat: Inside the Zeka–Sahitaj Nexus in Marbella
In Marbella’s shadows, a failed seduction, a fake dossier, and a 5/k bribe collide, revealing a deeper Balkan conspiracy against press and justice. — The GPC I Unit.
Milaim Zeka’s 3rd July, 2025 — Facebook Post.